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Cybersecurity, one of the expanding research area, has tremendous importance towards critical
infrastructures. Organizations like power, oil, and gas use SCADA communication to manage and
control their outstations across wide area. Some of the standard SCADA protocols used are DNP3,
Modbus, IEC 61850 to control, share, and exchange real-time information. The communication
involves both cyber-physical system processes and requires high availability and integrity of the
data. DNP3, a TCP based protocol, is widely used in these infrastructures. With the involvement
of the cyber, the systems are susceptible to network-based intrusions and cyber attacks. Since
the communication is between the control center and its vast network of outstations, it becomes a
challenge to monitor and control the network activity of the whole system. It creates a demand in
the visualization of different network areas and a need to monitor their network activity from a single
console. This work presents a framework to bring the distributed setup of the intrusion detection
system and provide an optimal solution to detect network intrusions and abnormal behavior. The
main focus of the work is to provide a single dashboard view to monitor the network activities of
different outstations.
Further, the design and implementation of the distributed setup are explained in various archi-
tectures. Different types of IDS rules based on packet payload, packet flow, and time threshold are
generated to show how an attack surface of the system can be reduced and detect different types
of cyber attacks. Then, IDS testing and evaluation is performed with a set of rules in different se-
quences. The detection time is measured for different IDS rules and the results are plotted. All the
experiments are conducted in Power Cyber Lab, ISU using two-area and 39-Bus power model and
presented in CPS and Grid-Ex based training. After successful testing and evaluation, the knowl-
edge and implementation are transferred to field deployment. In the last section, the conclusion of
the work is summarized and a possible extension of future work is discussed.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of modern technologies, internet communication has become seamlessly efficient
and reliable, but simultaneously the cyber attacks are getting more advanced and sophisticated.
In this backdrop, the network security of an organization turn as a primary goal to protect. In the
infrastructures like power and energy, which has both physical and cyber layer are integrated with
the legacy systems. These industrial control systems exchange control and operational data between
the control and production networks frequently. Modern society depends hugely on electricity and
any significant impact on the critical infrastructure may disturb daily life. The demand for electric
power is increasing every day particularly in urban districts [1]. A stealthy coordinated cyber
attack like 2015 Ukraine blackout can result in power outages affecting around 225,000 customers
[2]. Malwares like Stuxnet infected the Industrial controls systems made by Siemens creating a
disturbance of the processes controlling the centrifuges of Iran’s nuclear reactor [3]. Availability
and integrity of the data becomes one of the primary concerns in industrial communication. It
creates a demand to achieve highly secure and reliable communication. Therefore, the need for
efficient management of the power and reliable supply to the consumer is needed. Due to increasing
load demands, the power distribution management needs to improve efficient and reliable power
supply.
Smart grid which is slowly evolving, profoundly relies on ethernet-based communication pro-
tocols like DNP3. The power grid can be divided into three stages, like generation, transmission,
and distribution. As shown in the Figure 1.1, the power grid is expanding the need to provide
cost-effective, and reliable power becomes challenging. At this juncture, the smart grid evolves
as a modernized solution. The central aspect of the smart grid is to create decentralized power
distribution where the consumer plays a small intrinsic role towards power contribution locally
[4]. To make cost-effective and energy-efficient, consumers today are installing solar energy panels
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which helps not only in lowering the utility bills as well as the load demand is decreased. In some
cases, solar farms are built, which helps in a small-scale amount of power production and feeding
back to the grid as commerce. With the use of the latest smart energy meters it is possible to use
the power resources more efficiently. Smart energy meters provide real-time data of consumer load
consumption to the regional control center, which helps in balancing the power loads of different
areas and reducing power outages [5]. Smart energy meters integrated with solar panels offer
detailed feedback of the energy to the grid through incentives from the utilities. The network data
exchanged through SCADA communication has high importance to availability, integrity, and con-
fidentiality. In this order, availability is extremely critical as all the process that is being managed
and control is in real-time. In traditional security, confidentiality and integrity of the message is
given more importance. However, in critical communications availability of the data packets are
given the primary importance [6]. Then follows the integrity; where the data exchanged between
the server and the clients should be maintained highly integrated. Any slight compromise in the
integrity of the data received may lead to disastrous events. Confidentiality has the lowest prior-
ity compared to other two. The data communication in most of the SCADA environment is not
encrypted, since encryption creates an additional overhead time that hinders the availability of
critical communication.
Figure 1.1 Power Transmission
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The current state-of-the-art in intrusion detection and prevention system is presented in the
upcoming section. The main focus of this work is to provide a distributed IDS/IPS to decrease the
attack surface of the system by using various types of IDS rules. It describes the depth of the dis-
tributed intrusion and prevention system architecture, the need for secure SCADA communication
and explains in detail about the network nodes and operation. Also in the evaluation section, how
the order of IDS rules makes the detection time faster is shown. Then, several types of IDS rules
are generated based on the given scope of cyberattacks. Chapter 3 gives an overview of SCADA
protocols like DNP3 and Cyberattack classification and describes the IDS rule generation based on
various types to deter malicious cyber activity.
1.1 Motivation for Secure SCADA Communication
Modern organizations use internet in different ways; their first-order security comes as firewall,
IDS, IPS, security incident and event management (SIEM) and data analytics. The use of an ad-
vanced firewall which has an application layer filtering can evade most of the cyber attacks. On
the other hand, cyber attacks are developing more stealthy. Intrusion detection and prevention
systems like rule-based, analysis-based, and behavior-based help in detecting real-time attackers.
There is also much demand in monitoring the network activity to analyze the network behavior
of the system which has anomalous behaviors. Also, the bandwidth and network usage statistics
are continuously monitored to find out any abnormal system behavior. When an organization has
multiple areas, the operations face a challenging task to manage its network of clients. The top
concern remains to protect their official data across multiple areas from a single standpoint, which
leads to a distributed intrusion detection and prevention system. The security standardization has
a different perspective view for information technology (IT), and operational technology (OT) en-
vironments as the risks are different in each other domains. The entire system process is dependent
on both Cyber and Physical process, any discrepancies in time between the Sever and the client can
create disastrous effects. Since OT systems use sensors to regulate critical processes and are related
to legacy systems, the priority for availability is highest rather than integrity and confidentiality.
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1.1.1 Background
Many operational networks are vulnerable to cyber-attack vectors due to a lack of in-depth
security. The information security priority for the operational technology and Information tech-
nology is shown at Figure 1.2. It is not a practical approach to apply IT security measures to the
Operational environment since availability is more concerned for Industrial control systems. The
network of SCADA has a master server to connect to its client at outstations to perform real-time
operations without any compromise in security, and are connected to provide mechanical stabil-
ity. In this communication that uses a protocol like DNP3, Modbus, IEC 81560: the attacker can
easily exploit the protocol layer fields like function codes, data objects, headers, and payload by
observing stealthily. Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) a widely used SCADA protocol has
function codes present in DNP3 application layer that are exploitable by an adversary. There are
28 types of attacks related to DNP3 protocol exploiting the function codes and other data fields in
the data-link and DNP3 application layer [7]. These protocol fields can create more vulnerabilities
which can lead to attacks like man-in-the-middle, denial-of-service and data integrity attacks. There
emerges a variety of threats conducted by various threat actors or activities supported by illegal
groups against critical sector operated by SCADA. At this point, it is highly essential to provide
robust technologies to prevent malicious activity and secure SCADA communications. Stealthy
cyber-attacks like IP spoofing can manipulate the whole network header of the packet and can
bypass the existing security measures. Firewall and Intrusion detection system lacks the scope of
detecting IP-based spoofing attacks. These incidents and attacks happening at the DNP3 protocol
is expected to increase because of the advanced development and besides the use of legacy SCADA
systems. The use of legacy infrastructure paves ample space for the attackers to exploit using
modern tools and technologies.
1.1.2 Limitations due to Legacy Infrastructure
The traditional architecture used to build critical systems are difficult to upgrade to the current
technologies. Since many limitations are needed to overcome if the infrastructure is going to trans-
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Figure 1.2 Security triad for OT versus IT
form, it requires a massive effort and difference in changing the technology used in the legacy and
the current technologies. The operational technology consists of hardware and software processes
that are dependent on each other. Any difference between these processes can deliver unreliable out-
puts. This connection creates a gap between existing and modern technology. Most of the systems,
like process control domains (PCD), Management and distributed systems, programmable logic
controllers(PLC), SCADA are dependent on each other. Standard DNP3 protocol lacks encryption
and authentication, which gives attackers to perform sniffing and reconnaissance. The vulnerability
of standard DNP3 protocol creates different types of cyberattacks like Man-in-the-middle and Data
integrity attacks [8]. Many SCADA operators still use standard DNP3 version, although the latest
DNP3-SA (secure authentication) is still available. DNP3-SA provides an authentication mecha-
nism used to ensure that messages are exchanged between an authenticated Master and Client.
The traditional operational networks are designed for specific security properties to comply with
the availability, integrity, and confidentiality. The use of DNP3 in SCADA communications has
security issues, and most existing DNP3 communication lacks authentication, data encryption, and
access control. While enhanced versions of DNP3 like DNP3 secure authentication, DNP3sec have
been reaching the industry slowly but still the majority of the SCADA is working with the legacy
systems and protocol.
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1.2 State-of-the-art of Cyber-Security in SCADA
1.2.1 Related work
DNP3, a protocol designed for distributed communications has some limitations. In order
to identify the appropriate requirements for generating various IDS rule sets, the DNP3 packet
structure and the protocol has to be studied. The work in [9] shows a list of attacks that are
exploited in the SCADA environment. It shows that there are many data fields in the DNP3
layer like data-link, transport, and application which can be exploited. Also, in [10] shows the
vulnerability of the protocol stack and how it can impact the secure communication. Using this
information, we used to test the developed IDS rules at the Power cyber lab, Iowa. Therefore, we
explored the types of attacks by exploiting the function code and examined the system analysis. The
attack data sets from [11] show a wide variety to explore the exploitable features of the protocol. The
work in [12] proposes a new type of IDS, where it dynamically modifies the firewall rules according
to the IDS. It introduces a dynamic IDS, which unites with the firewall to prevent various DNP3
attacks. The work in [13] displays an intrusion detection framework based on analysis-driven IDS.
It shows how the analysis of the traffic in SCADA can be used in the intrusion framework. In [14]
proposes a game theory approach in finding the vulnerability of the DNP3 and showcase a model to
define it. Also, it describes the DNP3 attack, which can be detected using advanced techniques used
in game theory. The latest development in the DNP3 protocol is DNP3 secure authentication [15],
which includes end-to-end cryptographic authentication. It provides more authentication in the
application layer of the server and client, which makes it very hard to impersonate. Also, in [16]
provides a framework for communication with confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. The smart
grid is a network of the different terminal device; the work in [17] uses this framework to propose
a dendritic cell algorithm. The work focuses on the packet header that is exchanged between the
different nodes to detect the anomalous traffic.
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1.3 Scope of Research
1.3.1 Reduction of Attack Surface
Attack surface is the entry point for the cyber-attacks. An Adversary‘s main aim is to exploit
these attack surface and create a cyber-attack. By reducing the attack surfaces, we can able to
reduce vulnerability risk of the network. Since the organization contains many technology resources,
from the point of security, we need to minimize the attack surfaces of the cyber resource we have.
When these Attack surface are exploited using any technology or tools is called as Attack Vector.
Attack surface is of three significant types, namely Software attack surface, Hardware attack surface,
and Human attack surface. When a network is exposed, the vulnerability is exposed, then an attack
surface of an organization increases. Finding an attack surface is quite challenging since attack
surfaces are changing every day of its dynamic nature. There is a various number of vectors that
lead to types of attack surfaces like open ports, weak firewall rules, web pages, weak Access list
rules. The upcoming chapters show how attack surfaces are identified and decreased using different
techniques.
However, before entering into the Classification of Attack surface, let us describe what an attack
surface is?. An Attack Surface of a network can be defined as all possible endpoints which are having
access directly or indirectly to the Internet without any security checkpoint. An Attack Surface is
a medium for attackers to exploit using different types of attack vectors. Any Cyber resources that
correspond with the Internet, directly or indirectly tend to be a form of Attack surface. An Attack
surface can be viewed from two different perspectives as an attacker and defender. From the point
of an attacker, it is more interested in the exposure of the systems and applications used inside the
private network, whereas from the point of the defender, it is more concerned with the protection of
the systems and applications. Hence, for a secure private network, learning an attack surface needs
both attacker and defender point of view. In this work, we consider the software process running
obscure, and the open ports which are listening tends to be the attack surface of the system. By
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having this information, robust IDS and IPS rules are designed to decrease the attack surface of
the system and for the network.
1.3.2 Distributed Intrusion Detection and Prevention System
Many technologies have been employed to combat unwanted cyber activities. An IDS in a
network serves as a device that continuously monitors the network traffic events. IDS also analyze
the system’s behavior and protects critical systems against the malicious activity of the attackers.
The primary focus of this work is to provide distributed intrusion detection and prevention system
in a network to filter and log the inbound traffic and outbound traffic. This advanced functionality
provides threat signature detection, virus signature detection, protocol, and port filtering, and
includes network and application layer level protection. Unlike traditional firewalls, IDS with IPS
has greater visibility and control in real-time.
There are different types of IDS like anomaly-based IDS and the signature-based IDS. This work
focuses on signature-based IDS, which uses a set of signatures to identify any possible malicious
activities. The structure of the IDS can be of two types centralized or distributed. Centralized
IDS acts as a standalone system with no interaction with its clients. In the distributed setup,
the network consists of multiple IDS clients connecting to the Master IDS. Distributed network
monitoring allows an overall view of the network activity from the Master console. It provides the
network administrator the flexibility to improve network monitoring and control various networks
and take preventive measures in real-time. With this setup, the network admin can tremendously
reduce the attack surface and increase the visibility and control of multiple network areas. However,
the firewalls at the gateway of SCADA communication are whitelisted according to IP addresses,
applications, websites, users, processes, devices to limit unwanted access. Also, the firewalls black-
list the rest, where any suspicious activity found on any application, user, IP addresses, websites
can be blocked immediately. Next-Generation Firewall has advanced features like whitelisting and
blacklisting in the level of physical-MAC addresses, network, and application layer. In this topol-
ogy, all the Endpoints are considered as Client, and the Master controls all clients. The Master is
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located in the Control center has an accessible server or gateway within the network, which installs
a client software having security policies, IDS rules, and other features on each of the endpoints.
The Highlight of this work is to provide Network administrator complete control over the
network of different areas in a single management dashboard. It mainly aims to secure every
endpoint by applying policies to block unwanted access attempts and other risky activity at these
points of entry. It can maintain greater control of the network access points and more effectively
block threats. It also provides extended features such as monitoring and blocking risky or malicious
activities
In chapters two and three, we discuss briefly on how SCADA traffic is studied. An IDS rule
generation based on traffic behavior and the functionality of the relays is introduced. The network
communication involving critical commands have a particular time sequence, which can be called
as the behavior of the system is analyzed. Similarly, the protocol used in this work is DNP3,
which has around thirty-five different functions are studied in our experiments. With all the
above considerations, an algorithm is devised to show the generation of IDS rules. After the rule
generation, the system is made to have the initial operations. Then it is conducted with various
cyberattacks to check the performance of the IDS rule generation algorithm. It is validated by
observing whether the IDS ruleset can detect numerous cyberattacks within the given scope. After
this deployment and testing, the ruleset order is scrutinized to check the most suitable sequence to
get the minimum detection time. Two types of rule order are used to test the minimum detection
time, are then compared with the graphical terms, and the results are given in chapter 4. Finally,
a valid rule sequence order with a rule generation algorithm within a given scope is proposed and
evaluated with enough results.
1.4 Organization of Research work
The Figure 1.3 shows the roadmap of this work from July 2018 till July 2019. Most of the
work in the initial phase was laid on the understanding and construction of the thoughts that
carried us here. Attack surface Host Analyzer, a tool developed by Washington state university to
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show how attack surfaces are connected with hidden processes and listening ports. After learning
the different types of attack surfaces, there was an opportunity to find a possible way to reduce
it. In October 2018, we demonstrated the standalone IDS testing and showed several IDS rules
and reduction of the attack surface. After initial testing, there was a demand in distributed setup
since the substations are located across different areas. In December the work focussed on the
distributed configuration and developing advanced DNP3 rules based on traffic patterns. The
testing of the advanced rules was done at the power cyber lab, Iowa. Phase I was started in the
month of March; where Master and Client-1 is deployed at the control center and substation-1
network. Both systems were tested and are up in the production network. In May 2019, this
work played a primary part in CPS training for the power utilities. Also, the work was presented
in conferences like Electric Power Research Center (EPRC), Graduate and Professional Student
Research Conference (GPSRC), Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC). More details
regarding conferences and outreach are discussed in Chapter 5. Later, the evaluation of the IDS
is performed in May 2019. Different rule order sequence was conducted to find the least detection
time, and the results are shown in Chapter 4. In July 2019, Client-2 is deployed with a robust
rule sequence and advanced DNP3 rules. Finally, the work is documented and paper regarding the
rule generation and rule order sequence is published with the title “Distributed Intrusion Detection
System using Semantic-based Rules for SCADA in Smart Grid”. The results have a graphical
picture for the rule order sequence to achieve the least detection time are presented.
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Figure 1.3 Organization of Research work
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CHAPTER 2. DISTRIBUTED IDS DESIGN FOR SCADA
COMMUNICATION
2.1 Introduction
The evolution of the power grid has slowly transformed into a smart grid for two decades.
The industrial control system operation can be summarised as data communication between the
sensors, PLCs, and other devices in the field on a real-time basis. ICS plays primary importance
in controlling field hardware equipment and systems. In industrial automation, controllers and
advanced sensors need the synchronization. SCADA Smart grid relies extensively on the poll
and response communication of critical controls and data objects. In the existing background
of cyber threats, attacks related to these infrastructures are increasing due to the use of legacy
infrastructure and the vulnerabilities of the traditional architectures and protocols. Communication
protocols used in the Industrial control system (ICS) such as DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850 have
existing vulnerabilities. The communication that happens between the different networks in the grid
demands a distributed Intrusion detection system. Gaining an understanding of network activities
are required in real-time to protect from the cyber attacks. The requirement for a detection system
that communicates to a central node from all the networks is much expected. This chapter discovers
the elements of a distributed IDS with different architecture [18]. Also, the Intrusion prevention
system is built using In-line architecture. At the end of this chapter, the attack surface of a system
is mapped using a tool called Attack surface Host Analyser, [19] a tool developed by Washington




The use of distributed intrusion detection systems gives the flexibility for the cyber network op-
erator to monitor and control the network of its outstations. It eases the operator through providing
a single console view of its entire grid network; in this way, the operator can potentially leverage
this feature in the smart grid. Distributed IDS architecture, includes one Master node and many
sensors. All forward nodes are connected to the master node. The Client has a sensor installed
that operates in promiscuous mode to collect the network information and forwards to the master.
In Standalone operation, the master node has its database server. Whereas in Distributed deploy-
ment has two architecture. With or without the storage node deployment. In distributed storage
node deployment, the master maintains a storage node to forward the network data information
for future queries. Storage of these data analytics are useful for analyzing the system states, and
behaviors of the process to identify any abnormal behaviors. Advanced machine learning uses data
analytics to train a proper model for IDS. Another feature of using this distributed IDS is the cus-
tomized rule sets. The IDS rules are designed based on the traffic pattern, network packets, packet
flow, packet content and the packet threshold time; this is one of the most significant features that
can be tailored for different types of environment. This potential feature gives enormous flexibility
for the Cybersecurity expert to analyze and monitor the network data from a single standpoint.
Also, the operator can leverage the flexibility of writing different types of IDS rules that suits their
network environment.
2.1.2 Network Nodes and Operation
In the distribution setup, we consider different types of nodes according to the respective func-
tions. The nodes are Linux distribution endpoints. The nodes are categorized into Master Node,
Sensor Node, Storage Node, Forward node, Heavy node.
Master Node: In standalone deployment, the master node functions the same as the sensor
node. In a distributed deployment, we have a Master node and several sensor nodes. All Sensor
nodes like Forward node, Storage node, and Heavy nodes are connected to the Master node. The
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Master node controls the operation of its distributed network. All the Sensor nodes have a secure
shell (SSH) connection to the Master node for communication. Any IDS rule update, network
security updates, host intrusion updates done in the Master, is then easily pushed to the Sensor
node. It provides flexibility for the network administrator to push the updates for the different
clients from the single node. The feature of monitoring and controlling the updates of the IDS
makes the distributed setup more comfortable to handle. The Sensor node in return provides the
network activities which monitor through promiscuous mode and sends back to the Master, which
then transfers the information to the storage node.
Sensor node: The sensor node can be of Forward node, Storage or Heavy node. The sensor
node is Linux distribution Ubuntu-16.04 operating system. All sensor nodes are connected to the
Master node and are deployed only after installing the Master node. The network configuration
of the sensor node contains two or more interfaces. The primary interface is for the management
IP address of the Client machine. The management interface is used to connect to the Master via
SSH connection. The secondary interface is used for the sniffing of the Client network. There can
be one or more sniffing interface depending upon the requirement of the network which is used to
monitor the network traffic.
Forward node: In this node, the sensor assimilates and forwards all the network-related logs and
information to the Master. Forward node contains network packet capture detection, rule detection
engine, and analysis detection engine. The forward node updates the IDS rules and security updates
and compares its network traffic using the network packet capture. After the network packet
capture, it then checks the rule signature using the rule detection engine to check any pattern
is matching. Once any of the IDS rule signatures match the network packet, immediately the
detection engine sends an alert to the Master. The alert is then able to visualize at the dashboard
of the Master node.
Storage Node: Storage node is an additional node connected to the Master, where all the
network traffic logs are forwarded from the sensor to the Master, the Master then forwards the
logs to the storage node. After the sensor node captures all network log and information, storing
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this information requires huge memory, which is a challenge for the Master node, and doing this in
the Master may reduce the computing time in intrusion alerts and lowers the performance. Hence
storage node is employed. This node operates as a database server when the Master node queries
about any information; it takes from the storage node. The storage node stores all the logs and are
used as data analytics for advanced statistics and analyze the different network behavior [20]. The




The standalone deployment comprises of a single node, which combines the functions of the
Master Node, forward node, and storage node. This type of implementation is used if the network
area is limited. It is used locally to manage and monitor the network for testing. This type of
deployment is used for testing in the labs and for evaluation. This implementation can be seen in
Figure 2.1. In this type of deployment, the Master is employed as both the sensor and the manager.
In this node, a single interface can operate as both the management and the sniffing. This type of
deployment is useful for organizations having limited network areas.
Figure 2.1 Standalone deployment
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2.2.2 Distributed Deployment
The Distributed deployment comprises of one Master node, one or more forward nodes, one or
more storage nodes. This architecture is widely deployed in the industry as production deployment
compared to the standalone deployment, as it provides more scalability, performance and also
handles the heavy network traffic and log management. This implementation is shown in Figure 2.2.
It is highly recommended to use the distributed deployment for the production network, and the
use of the storage node provides more extended options to learn about the data analytics and elastic
search.
Figure 2.2 Distributed deployment
Another type of implementation called Heavily distributed deployment is used when there is a
Storage node in the network. The Master node uses an additional node as storage to store a vast
amount of the network logs. The heavily distributed deployment consists of a Master node, one
or more heavy nodes. Heavy nodes are the forward node, which has both the functionality of the
sensor and elastic search. This implementation is seen in the Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3 Heavily Distributed deployment
2.2.3 In-line IPS Deployment
The main aim of the IDS is to detect the malicious network activity and alert the admin. The
IDS uses the signatures to match the network packets for finding an alert. When this IDS is placed
at the gateway of the network or the in-line to the device, it can now operate as a prevention system.
The intrusion prevention system is able to detect and defend against various types of cyberattacks
like Denial of service. This type of implementation is one of the advantages for the administrator as
it provides the functionality of the detection and prevention of malicious activities. The Figure 2.4
shows the IPS deployment architecture.
2.3 Design algorithm
In this section, we discuss IDS rule generation, as shown in the Figure 2.5. The primary step
in IDS rule generation is to study the network traffic of the environment. In this case, we consider
the DNP3 traffic to analyze different commands that are exchanged between the control center and
substations. The communication of DNP3 commands follows a particular pattern that depends on
the utilities network and conditions. The algorithm starts from regular SCADA traffic to pattern-
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Figure 2.4 In-line IPS Deployment
1 and pattern-2. The traffic pattern can be based on the protocol, services, critical commands,
packet payload, content, time threshold. In this consideration, a list of traffic patterns is defined.
After having the traffic pattern, the IDS rules are tailored to detect a particular incident, which is
discussed in chapter 3. In the Figure 2.5, it shows that when a new pattern is detected, a new IDS
rule is generated else, it is resolved to the Normal operation and the Figure 2.6 shows properties
to consider for designing robust IDS. After the new IDS rule is generated, the rule is sent to the
repository, and finally, it is updated with the regular network operation. This brings a robust
adaptive approach to detect different types of cyber incidents in the network. In this work, we
define different sets of IDS rule based on various traffic patterns, which are discussed in Chapter 3.
2.3.1 Flow chart for rule generation
The general SCADA traffic from the server to substation to the endpoint is shown in the
Figure 2.7. In this picture, we can see that each substation is having many Relays, and each
relay is controlling many endpoints like generator, power transformer, circuit breaker. The traffic
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Figure 2.5 IDS Rule generation algorithm
pattern for each end device is different. Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 shows the traffic route from the
SCADA server to the end devices. Now, each relay has different endpoints and are controlled by
different function codes. The network traffic is different for each end-device for different relays
and substations. This creates different traffic patterns based on the station IDs, relay IDs, and
device addresses. The Figure 2.8 shows IDS rule design flow, and Figure 2.9 shows the functions
to consider for creating robust IDS rules for various outstations.
Table 2.1 Network traffic pattern in SCADA for Substation-1 Relay 1
Pattern Network traffic
Pattern-1 SCADA server - SS1 - Relay1 - GEN
Pattern-2 SCADA server - SS1 - Relay1 - TX
Pattern-3 SCADA server - SS1 - Relay1 - CB
Table 2.2 Network traffic pattern in SCADA for Substation-1 Relay 2
Pattern Network traffic
Pattern-4 SCADA server - SS1 - Relay2 - GEN
Pattern-5 SCADA server - SS1 - Relay2 - TX
Pattern-6 SCADA server - SS1 - Relay2 - CB
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Figure 2.6 Proposed Multistage Properties for the Robust IDS Design
2.4 Attack Surface Analysis
In this section, we are using a tool called Attack surface Host Analyzer, a tool developed
by Washington state university to check the attack surface such as open ports, hidden processes
running in the machine. The idea is to show the attack surface of the system by showing the open
ports and then by using the help of the IDS and in-line IPS, we try to reduce the attack surface of
the system. Then using the same tool, we rerun the analysis to show the reduction of the attack
surface. The Figure 2.10 shows the attack surface of the system before the IDS and in-line IPS
deployment. As we see in this figure, many hidden processes are still listening to ports that are
open. These are the established connections before and now are in listening state. These open
listening ports creates a path for the attacker to learn about the system and the processes running
in the respective ports. Then after deploying the In-line IPS with the customized rules. Figure 2.11
shows that most of the open listening ports are blocked and the hidden processes are no more in
connection other than the expected address. The IDS rule for designing the system are discussed
in the next chapter.
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Figure 2.7 Traffic pattern in SCADA
Figure 2.8 Design flow of IDS
Figure 2.9 Design function of IDS
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Figure 2.10 Before IDS/IPS Deployment
Figure 2.11 After In-line IPS
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CHAPTER 3. CYBER-ATTACK CLASSIFICATION AND IDS RULE
GENERATION
The primary step of any cyber attack is reconnaissance. Before launching any attack, the
attacker first tries to learn, analyze, and understand the network, then plot the vulnerable target
and direct the attack. During the period of reconnaissance, the process of discovering hosts, IP
address, port scanning, identifying the OS and services used in a network is initiated. It depends on
the level of exposure due to insecure security device configurations and firewall access rules, which
leads to the exposure of vulnerability. It exposes the organization’s network and hardware surface,
which is exploitable by the attackers. Once the attacker gets the ground information of the target,
then they proceed to identify the vulnerability of that system and find the ways to exploit it. Finding
these vulnerabilities inside the network is a crucial step in determining a cyber attack. The cyber
attacks are basically categorized into four types reconnaissance, with spoofing, without spoofing
and flooding. All the cyber attacks fall into one of the four categories mentioned above. After
scanning the entire network, the vulnerability report for each system in the network is collected.
The vulnerabilities in the report are measured in terms of CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposure) [21], which is a database for known information security vulnerabilities and exposures.
The CVE database is a catalog of vulnerabilities with an identification number for each known
vulnerability or exposure. The CVE is operated by MITRE corporation, to standardize the security
vulnerability of software and hardware. These CVEs are sorted based on a measurement called
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System), which is a numerical score provided by NIST [22],
National Vulnerability Database, National cybersecurity division. CVSS are represented in High,
Medium, and Low and are ranked based on the priority of the vulnerability. After we obtain
the vulnerability report of all the assets in the network based on the CVSS ranking, a detailed
analysis is done. From this report information, the attack surface of the network is classified
24
based on software attack surfaces, hardware attack surfaces, and physical/human attack surfaces.
In the software level, any application program interfaces, storage files that are listening to the
external network or the hidden process are vulnerable to the system. Similarly, in the hardware
level, unused ports, and hardware device exposure, remote connection creates an entry for attack
vectors. Employees unaware of cyber-related resources, social engineering attacks, and the latest
technologies used for security are considered to be human attack surface. The below table 3.1 lists
all the types of attack surfaces.
Table 3.1 Classification of Attack surface
Software attack surface Hardware attack surface Human attack surface
Unused API Unused ports Unaware of security policies
Storage files Network interfaces Unaware of social Engineering attacks
Databases Operating systems Human machine interface
unused directories remote access weak passwords
Social networking messages Plug-in devices P2P connection
Executable files like .exe Hardware patching
After examining the attack surface, the classification is done on the level of priorities for different
networks. By now, we know that attack surfaces are narrowed down to three different areas. When
any hardware related feature is exposed to the outside network, we try to obscure the level of
system exposure to the outside network; this reduces the hardware attack surface. Any software
and applications that are used in the critical network should be thoroughly tested and verified
the genuinely before the deployment. When the software running code that has an exploitable
vulnerability should be notified immediately. Similarly, software attack surface can be reduced
when any vulnerable software feature in the level of coding and testing is identified. Human
attack surface can be measured in terms of awareness of the employees in the organization. Hence,
increasing the awareness of security and strict policies can bring down the human attack surface.
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3.1 Analysis of Cyber-attacks in SCADA environment
From the work [23] it shows that 50% of the incidents are accidental, 30% are due to malware
caused by social engineering techniques. 11% is the potential attackers, which can be a group or an
organization having immoral intentions. 9% counts on the internal attackers, which can be related
to likely or unaware of the act. An internal attacker can be caused due to human attack surfaces.
Most of the incident is related to the cyber intrusions like ping scan, port scanning, OS detection,
process and service scanning. The attacker’s primary step is to perform the reconnaissance to
gather all the information regarding the target system. The attacker then enumerates all the
learned vulnerabilities of the target to execute the next action. Once the adversary learns the IP
address, open ports, services running, it eases to launch an attack vector. The attacks based on
IP address are denial-of-service, IP flooding, data integrity attacks, DNP3 flooding. Once the IP
address of the system is exposed, it is bound to receive any network packet. Sometimes the whole
IP layer of the network packet is crafted stealthily to appear as the outbound packet of the trusted
network. This type of attack is termed as IP-based spoofing, which has a spoofed IP layer to bypass
the firewall and IDS. IP spoofing is used to deliver a malicious payload compromising the security
features of the host.
Table 3.2 Common types of Cyber attacks in SCADA
Type of Incident IDS Alerts
Reconnaissance ICMP Ping alert, TCP Scanning alert
Denial of service DOS alert, Timing factor alert
Spoofing Timing factor and connection not established
Replay attack Sequence mismatch and timing factor alert
Data Integrity Incorrect checksum alert
3.1.1 Cyber-attack Classification
The Figure 3.1 shows the scope of cyberattacks considered in this study. The incidents are
categorized based on four types, as shown in the figure. Reconnaissance includes all kinds of
system scanning like IP addresses, ports, services, operating systems. Denial-of-service is one of
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the frequent attacks that occur for any network. It includes all types of packet flooding such
as Ping-to-death, IP flooding, DNP3 flooding, Distributed Denial of service (DDOS), brute force
attack. Other attacks are classified into two types like with or without spoofing. Attacks due to
without spoofing like data integrity, replay attack, Man-in-the-middle, social engineering attack
uses a random IP header of the packet to deliver the malicious payload to the target. However,
the firewall and IPS can prevent these attacks. In spoofing based attacks, the attacker spoofs the
whole IP header and tries to deliver the malicious payload to the target. Spoofing based attacks
are difficult to prevent since the IP header looks the same as the IP header of the actual sender.
Spoofing attacks can happen on the DNP3 protocol, where the attacker uses a spoofed IP header
and add the DNP3 packet header on top. However, based on traffic analysis, we can detect spoofing
based attacks. In the following section, there are IDS rules which can identify these spoofing attacks
are discussed.
Figure 3.1 Cyber-attack Classification
3.1.2 Existing Vulnerabilities and threats
DNP3 an open standard communication protocol, where the features are available on the in-
ternet. Since all details are available, it becomes easy for an adversary to understand the existing
vulnerabilities and the way to exploit it. As DNP3 communication is involved in a distributed
architecture, the remote devices which are located in different areas will have remote network ac-
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cess. This remote network access point creates an attack surface and thus can be countable on the
vulnerability. There are many categories of threats and risks related to SCADA communication
using DNP3 protocol [8]. The DNP3 protocol has three layers; the application layer contains the
critical function code fields. There exist many threats and attacks when these fields are exploited.
In the next section, we study the DNP3 protocol stack and discuss different types of threats and
cyber-attacks related to it.
3.2 Network Protocols used in SCADA
SCADA Server needs a reliable communication protocol to control physical operations car-
ried out at remote outstations. The system uses an application that involves the Programmable
logic controller (PLC). These remote physical devices are monitored and controlled using critical
commands. The basic SCADA architecture contains multiple communicating devices, as shown
in Figure 2.7. This diagram shows that the relays are controlled by the Remote Terminal Unit
(RTU), which sends the control signal. In some cases, we have Master Terminal Unit (MTU) which
controls many RTUs and the following relays. The commonly used SCADA protocols are DNP3,
Modbus, IEC 61850, Profibus. In this work, we are studying the DNP3 protocol, which is widely
used in North America.
3.2.1 DNP3 Protocol stack
DNP3 a flexible, reliable, and open standard communication protocol that supports distributed
communication to multiple devices at different outstation levels. It also supports multiple data
types such as critical data, time-synchronized data, time-stamped data, data with priorities, data
with responses, data with acknowledgments. It handles two-way communication, which can be a
request-response or unsolicited response communication. It provides unicast, multicast, anycast,
and broadcast communication, which gives the protocol to handle the distributed architecture
seamlessly. The DNP3 protocol is a TCP based connection-oriented protocol. It has three different
layers, as shown in the Figure 3.2. The main fields in the DNP3 link layer are the outstation source
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and destination address. The control field includes function codes related to link status, request,
reset, confirmation, ACK, NACK of user data; this builds synchronization in the communication.
The transport control layer creates the sequence number for the packets in the communication. It
is responsible for dividing the application layer messages and assigning the sequence number to
provide reliable and uninterrupted transmission. Finally, in the DNP3 application layer, there are
many critical fields such as application control, function code, internal indications, DNP3 objects.
Among all these fields, the most commonly exploited field is the DNP3 application layer function
codes. In this chapter, we are focusing on the exploitation and incidents related to DNP3 application
layer function codes. Then IDS rules are designed to prevent these types of incidents, and their
performance is evaluated.
Figure 3.2 Schematic of DNP3 packet
In DNP3 communication, as shown in the Figure 3.3, the master and the outstation exchanges
two types of the messages; request and response. The DNP3 Master sends a request message to
its respective outstation to enquire about the status of the outstation. Similarly, the outstation
replies a response message with the status information to the Master. The Figure 3.4 shows the
list of request message the DNP3 Master sends to the outstation and the Figure 3.5 shows the two
types of response message replied by the outstation to the DNP3 Master.
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Figure 3.3 Communication between DNP3 Master and Outstation
3.2.2 Cyber attacks related to DNP3
DNP3 Data Integrity attack: As we discussed, the DNP3 has three layers datalink, transport
and application layer. Most of the critical commands are set in the application layer. These critical
commands directly operate the remote system when the packet is delivered. The attacker tries to
exploit these commands to create instability. There are many types of data integrity attacks related
to these three layers. In this work, we study the following DNP3 data integrity attacks. All the
attacks mentioned here have experimented with real-time testing in SCADA traffic, and a suitable
IDS rule is designed to prevent it. The cyber attack and defense work is conducted, tested, and
the rule detection performance is analyzed in Power cyber lab, Iowa state university.
DNP3 Select and Operate attack: Most of the existing DNP3 communication is not encrypted.
Since encryption takes additional overhead time, which limits availability. In DNP3, Select and
Operate are two Functions. During system operation in SCADA, Select command is always initiated
before Operate. The attacker sniffs the payload of both the command and delivers it to the target.
This attack can lead to disastrous situations like a blackout, power outage. It is conducted in the
lab and an IDS rule is made to prevent it.
DNP3 Direct operate attack: As compared to the previous attack, this is more severe. We have
a function code 5; Direct operate in DNP3. This function does not involve with the Select function
of the DNP3, as it directly operates the system. Now, it becomes simple for an attacker to modify
one payload instead of two. It can affect the power system and leads to a blackout. Similar IDS
rule with content and time threshold is given to check whether the traffic pattern is normal.
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Figure 3.4 DNP3 Request Function codes
Figure 3.5 DNP3 Responses Function codes
DNP3 Stop application attack: The function code related to Stop application is 12; an attacker
can use this information to exploit and perform unauthorized action. In Stop application attack,
the attacker tries to shut down or stop a functioning application. The impact of this could cause
instability in the power system or any control systems. An IDS rule with the content field is used
to counter it.
DNP3 Cold restart: Cold restart is used to clear the communication sequence and restart the
end device. This is generally used to check the self-test of the device. The function code related to
Cold restart is D (in hexadecimal); the attacker attempts this attack to perform an unauthorized
operation. The impact leads to the unavailability of the targeted device, and if the attacker is
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persistent, it can lead to Denial-of-service. An IDS rule with a time threshold to check the number
of packets is employed to prevent this.
DNP3 Data reset attack: It is a type of Data integrity attack. In this type of attack, the
attacker modifies the application layer field in the DNP3 protocol stack. The function code field in
the application has various control operations, which are exploitable. In this attack, the Function
Code F (in hexadecimal) is used, which is to Initialize data. It causes the substation to reinitialize
the data objects and creates a timing mismatch in the running process. This attack was tried in
the lab, using a python script with the above function code. And an IDS rule using the content
field is designed to prevent this attack.
DNP3 Disable Unsolicited Messages: Any updates from the outstation are given as a response
to the SCADA server. There are two types of responses sent to the server; Normal response and
Unsolicited response. In Normal response, the outstation replies to the server only when there is
a request message. Whereas in Unsolicited response, the outstation is bound to send the response
without any request from the server. In this type of attack, the attacker modifies the Function code
15, which is a request message from the server that implies the outstation to disable the Unsolicited
response. It intercepts the communication between the server and the substation, which makes the
server unaware of the system status. This attack can lead to a situation where the system can be
separated from real-time communication. It is implemented in the lab with a python script, and
an IDS rule is designed to prevent it.
3.3 Intrusion Detection System and Rules
3.3.1 IDS rule structure
The Figure 3.6 shows a sample IDS signature. The IDS rule consists of different fields like
action, protocol, source and destination address, source and destination port, the direction of the
packet [24]. It also contains the rule option field like content, packet flow, time threshold, offset,
and depth of the packet.
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Figure 3.6 IDS Rule Structure
Ping detection is one of the common means to check if the host is alive. The Figure 3.7 shows
a sample ping rule, where an alert is generated if any external host tries to ping the home network.
Figure 3.7 Sample Ping IDS rule
3.3.2 IDS Rule Generation based on Network Packet Payload
The network payload in standard DNP3 communication is not encrypted. Since the communica-
tion is not encrypted, there is a possible chance of sniffing. Critical commands from the SCADA are
operated to control the physical processes of the substation. Now, these commands if sniffed, can
be exploited by the threat actors. SCADA control commands like select, operate, direct operate,
response, unsolicited response, direct operate without response can be easily exploited. There is a
list of function codes in the DNP3 application layer stack that can be exploited. An IDS rule based
on the packet payload is generated to prevent this type of attack. Here we inspect every network
packets coming inbound with the payload of the given critical function whether it is matching with
the given destination and source IP address, port number, and the packet flow. This rule enables
the detection if the attacker injects any corrupted packet having the critical function to execute
the system. This rule detects and alerts the Master; the rule sample is shown in the Figure 3.8. In
this rule, only the communication between the DNP3 server and Home network is allowed. The IP
address of the DNP3 server and the Home network is predefined in the Master and sensor system.
Then the sensor checks for the content field in the rule which matches “04”. This is the DNP3
operate function code that server controls the client. The rule options field has both the offset and
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depth of the packet to identify which DNP3 function code is used. This rule prevents data integrity
attacks that happen at the DNP3 layer.
Figure 3.8 IDS rule based on packet payload
3.3.3 IDS Rule Generation based on Network Packet flow
After inspecting the packet payload, this rule is made to detect whether the inbound traffic is
coming as expected. It provides an option of checking whether the packet flow is established or not
established. Before any TCP session is established, there exists a three-way handshake between
the client and the server. This rule checks if the packet flow between the two sides is established or
not established depending on the source and destination IP address, port number, and the packet
payload. Any new TCP connection starts with SYN, SYN-ACK, and ACK; this rule finds whether
any of the three packets are getting exchanged. Below Figure 3.9 shows, the sample IDS rule based
on packet flow. Here the rule option field has flow-not established, states that any TCP handshake
other than the DNP3 server is alerted. This rule alerts all types of scanning from the IP address,
port scanning, service scanning that happen at the IP layer.
Figure 3.9 IDS rule based on packet flow
3.3.4 IDS Rule Generation based on Time-threshold
In SCADA traffic, the critical commands follow a specific pattern concerning time. For example,
DNP3 commands like select are not operated more than two times in 30 seconds. Similarly, there are
many network data patterns. If the traffic violates the standards, it is expected to be an anomalous
behavior. Similarly, this rule is written based on the time threshold of the DNP3 packet; it checks
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the network traffic, whether it is exceeding the number of attempts of that particular packet. If
there is any attempt at an excessive number of the DNP3 packet, an alert is triggered. This rule
detects all types of flooding attacks that happen in the SCADA environment. Flooding attacks
like TCP flooding, SYN flooding, MAC flooding, reverse TCP flooding, scanning, DNP3 flooding,
denial-of-service, distributed denial-of-service are detected. Below Figure 3.10 shows, the sample
IDS rule based on the time threshold. Here the rule option field has threshold type, which has the
count of the packet in a given time. This rule checks packet count and alerts if any count exceeds
in a given time.
Figure 3.10 IDS rule based on time threshold
3.3.5 IDS Rule Generation based on Incorrect Checksum
The checksum of the network packet shows whether the packet has arrived without losing data.
This rule is made to detect whether the checksum is matching at the receiving end. The alert is
generated if there is any incorrect checksum, thus notifies that the data has been compromised.
It provides an option of checking whether the packet flow is established or not established. The
sample rule is shown in the Figure 3.11. The rule option field has gid (generator id); these are
predefined identifiers in the rule detection engine to check the checksum of the network packet.
Figure 3.11 IDS rule based Incorrect Checksum
3.3.6 IDS Rule on TCP Application Layer
The IDS rule on the TCP Application layer directly checks the application-layer header. In
the sample rule shown in the Figure 3.12 which has DNP3 in the protocol field. This rule directly
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checks the DNP3 layer header. Thus the detection time is less compared to other rules that use
TCP protocol, offset and depth as rule option fields.
Figure 3.12 IDS rule based on the TCP Application layer
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CHAPTER 4. TESTBED IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this chapter, we discuss the implemented IDS/IPS with testing and evaluation of different
rules. As discussed in the previous chapter of designing the IDS rules, we generated around 40
advanced IDS rules. The design and implementation are entirely carried out at the Power Cyber
Lab, Iowa state university [25]. Different power model like a two-area model and 39-Bus power
model is used for the testing. The rules that have different option fields like content, time threshold,
and packet payload, packet flow are tested concerning the time. Testing of the rules with different
rule order sequence, detection time, and false positive and false negative rates are performed.
Different attacks are conducted to check the detection rate and compared different rule sequence
to get the most reliable detection time.
4.1 Two-area Model
In this power system model, we deployed two sensor nodes at RTU-1 and RTU-2 network. The
master node is installed at the control center. The Figure 4.1 shows two-area power model from
a Siemens SCADA. The SCADA server and the two RTUs are in regular operation. The sensor
is installed and has different sets of IDS rules based on DNP3 and other fields. Another virtual
machine having Kali operating system is created for an attacker from a different network. All the
attacks are initiated from the Kali machine are directed to RTU-1 and RTU-2. The results are then
noted from the sensor to check the detection time and the alert generated. The attacks performed
are within the scope of four types, as discussed in chapter 3. The detection time is measured for
different types of rules in sequence, and the result is plotted in the graph. Later, the same rule set
is arranged in a different sequence to get the best detection time, and the result is plotted in the
graph. Finally, the two graphs are compared to see the effective rule sequence to achieve the least
detection time.
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Figure 4.1 Two-area model
The Figure 4.2 shows how the detection time is calculated. We first measure the trip time from
the attacker machine to the RTU, then the difference between the wireshark time at the sensor and
the trip time gives the detection time. The IDS detection time is calculated for all the rules in this
fashion.
The Figure 4.3 shows the first rule order sequence; in this sequence, the rules are arranged
uniformly based on the action, protocol, content, and count. The detection time for each of the
rule is noted and plotted in the Figure 4.4.
The Table 4.1 shows the detection time for Ping alert, Table 4.2 shows the detection time for
flow not established alert, Table 4.3 shows the detection time for content rule, Table 4.4 shows
detection time for time threshold rule.
Similarly, Figure 4.5 shows the second rule order sequence; in this sequence, the rules are
arranged in reverse order. The order is based on the count, content, protocol, and action to check
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Figure 4.2 Detection Time Calculation
Figure 4.3 Rule order sequence 1
the detection time and performance. The detection time for each of the rule in Sequence-2 is
recorded and plotted in the Figure 4.6.
The table 4.5 shows the detection time for Ping alert, table 4.6 shows the detection time for flow
not established alert, table 4.7 shows the detection time for content rule, table 4.8 shows detection
time for time threshold rule.
The Figure 4.7 shows a comparison between the two rule sequences. It shows that in rule
sequence-2 the Ping, packet flow and content rule was detected with a small delay, as these rules
were placed in the bottom of the rule repository. The detection time for the time threshold rule
Table 4.1 Ping Rule - Sequence 1
One-way trip time Time in Wireshark Detection time
0.85 265 265-0.85 = 264.15
0.74 218 218-0.74 = 217.26
0.69 191 191-0.69 = 190.31
0.52 215 215-0.52 = 214.48
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Table 4.2 Flow not established Rule - Sequence 1
One-way trip time Time in Wireshark Detection time
0.85 422 422-0.85 = 421.15
0.74 434 434-0.74 = 433.26
0.69 427 427-0.69 = 426.31
0.52 329 329-0.52 = 328.48
Table 4.3 DNP3 Content rule - Sequence 1
One-way trip time Time in Wireshark Detection time
0.85 745 745-0.85 = 744.15
0.74 626 626-0.74 = 625.26
0.69 818 818-0.69 = 817.31
0.52 767 767-0.52 = 766.48
is lower than the sequence-1. It infers that the processing time is less for the rules placed on top
order compared to others. Thus the critical IDS rules are placed on the top of the rule repository
to get minimum detection time. The detection time also depends on the rule length, if the rule
contains many option fields, the processing time increases.
4.2 39-Bus Power system Model
In this power system model, we deployed one master and sensor nodes at RTU-1 and RTU-2
similarly as in the Two-area power model. The Figure 4.8 shows 39-Bus power model, here the
model is having three areas, where each area has many relays. In this case, the sensor-1 deployed
in Substation area-1 is monitoring many relays. As discussed in Chapter 2, the traffic pattern in
SCADA for a substation is different if it has many relays. Similarly, in this implementation, the
Table 4.4 Time threshold rule - Sequence 1
One-way trip time Time in Wireshark Detection time
0.85 1411 1411-0.85 = 1410.15
0.74 2861 2861-0.74 = 1449.26
0.69 4129 4129-0.69 = 1267.31
0.52 5640 5640-0.52 = 1510.48
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Figure 4.4 IDS Rule Sequence 1
SCADA server is now controlling a substation, which is having many relays. This implementation
is different compared to the Two-area power model, although the same sensor is deployed. In
this type, the SCADA traffic has many relays to a single substation; the packet rate and traffic
pattern are now changed, as compared to the two-area power model. Hence the IDS rules are
designed to match and prevent this type of network traffic. This implementation requires more
traffic analysis and provides more IDS rules compared to the previous. The main advantage of
having the distributed IDS is it offers the simplicity in designing the rules, for a complex network.
Table 4.5 Ping Rule - Sequence 2
One-way trip time Time in Wireshark Detection time
0.85 419 419-0.85 = 418.15
0.74 308 308-0.74 = 308.26
0.69 349 349-0.69 = 348.31
0.52 327 327-0.52 = 326.48
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Figure 4.5 Rule order sequence 2
Table 4.6 Flow not established - Sequence 2
One-way trip time Time in Wireshark Detection time
0.85 560 560-0.85 = 559.15
0.74 474 474-0.74 = 473.26
0.69 554 554-0.69 = 553.31
0.52 478 478-0.52 = 477.48
Table 4.7 DNP3 Content Rule - Sequence 2
One-way trip time Time in Wireshark Detection time
0.85 890 890-0.85 = 889.15
0.74 701 701-0.74 = 700.26
0.69 760 760-0.69 = 759.31
0.52 805 805-0.52 = 804.48
Table 4.8 Time threshold Rule - Sequence 2
One-way trip time Time in Wireshark Detection time
0.85 1346 1346-0.85 = 1345.15
0.74 1396 1396-0.74 = 1395.26
0.69 1239 1239-0.69 = 1238.31
0.52 1302 1302-0.52 = 1301.48
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Figure 4.6 IDS Rule Sequence 2
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Figure 4.7 Sequence 1 vs Sequence 2
44
Figure 4.8 39-Bus Power system model
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CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY AND FIELD DEPLOYMENT
In this chapter, we discuss entirely on how distributed IDS was successfully transferred to local
power utility in Iowa. For security reasons, the utility name is not disclosed. Before the start of the
deployment, we showed a presentation of a standalone master. A single master node performing
the operation of forward , storage and sensor node. Phase I and Phase II were started in January
2019 to bring out the advantage of having distributed IDS and to show the effectiveness of the IDS.
After conducting repeated experiments and testing at power cyber lab for different IDS rules based
on various scenarios, both phases were completed. The power utility had a primary control center,
where all the data operations are conducted. The control center has a network of substation which
are connected in ring fiber link. The deployment was assisted by a senior network engineer and
network administrator of the organization. The master node was transferred through a VMDK
virtual file. Later, master virtual machine was created from the VMDK. The client-1 and client-2
were installed and configured from the scratch and made the connection up to the master node.
5.1 Network Architecture
The overall diagram of the network architecture is shown in Figure 5.1, which shows all the
substations are inside the ring topology. Since the substation are having the critical control systems
they are kept in the ring topology. The topology shows a primary control center and two substations.
The primary control center is connected to the fiber ring which has an active link and backup
link. The links are connected to Layer 3 switch, which manages in providing different VLANs for
different areas of substations. All the IP addresses are assigned with respect to VLANs of that area
substation. For example: if the RTU-1 IP address is 10.1.200.210 in VLAN 20 then the Sensor-1
IP address is given as 10.1.200.110 in VLAN 20. Similarly, it is done for Substation-2, once both
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the sensors are up, they are connected to the Master, which is located in primary control center.
Figure 5.1 Network Architecture
5.2 Phase-I Deployment
5.2.1 Master node and Client-1
As shown in the Figure 5.1 the master node is started in Phase I. The master node is installed
in the operations network. After the master is up, client-1 is then installed in substation-1 network.
The deployment started with installing the packages and operating systems after analyzing SCADA
traffic and generating various IDS rules at the power cyber lab. The rule set is transferred and used
in phase I deployment. The rule set contains around 40 IDS rules using DNP3 packet content and
time threshold. The rule set is updated in the master; then it is pushed to the client-1 at substation-
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1 virtually. After the production is up, the time notifications of the IDS and features are recorded.
Also, the network setup and deployment agenda are saved for the phase II deployment.
5.3 Phase-II Deployment
5.3.1 Client-2 at Substation-2
In phase II deployment, client-2 is installed in the substation-2 network. After, phase I, the
network setup and experience made it comfortable to deploy the system. The previous IDS rules
were modified with additional detection features. Then the rule set is updated at the master. After
the master is up the rules are pushed to client-2. Similarly, in phase II, after the production is
up, the time notifications of the IDS and status are noted. Finally, the distributed IDS setup
commenced in Power cyber lab successfully achieved a field deployment. This work was presented
in conferences and played an essential part in the CPS training for various occasions.
5.4 Outreach and Conferences
After successful deployment, this work was presented at the Electric and Power Research Center
(EPRC) conference held in Ames, Iowa. The presentation was delivered by Dr. Ravikumar Gelli,
and senior network engineer from the power utility joined to share their experience of the deploy-
ment. Also, we took this work in demonstrating the need for the distributed Intrusion detection
setup for many CPS training. In May 2019, a team from Power cyber lab including Dr. Gelli,
Sathya Mohan and Burhan Hyder from Iowa state university provided cyber-defense training for
Florida reliability coordinating council (FRCC). This work was showcased in various CPS train-
ing and provided knowledge transfer to employees of the power utility. This work also played an
integral part during the NERCs GridEx based training conducted during the EPRC conference.
The work titled “ SIEM based Distributed IDS for SCADA” which engrossed the audience at the
6th Graduate and Professional and Student Research Conference (GPSRC). Also, The work was
awarded as the best research poster. The paper titled “Distributed Intrusion Detection System
using Semantic-based Rules for SCADA in Smart Grid” is submitted for the conference.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Summary
Securing data communications is one of the essential aspects to consider in critical infrastruc-
tures. While no network is immune to attacks, stable and efficient network security is necessary
to protect industrial communications. Good network security helps in reducing the risk of cyber-
attacks and decreases threats and vulnerability. There are several levels of network-level protection
to prevent cyber attacks like man-in-the-middle, data integrity attacks, social engineering, denial-
of-service attacks. Hence achieving secure communication is much needed in today’s world. The
security measures taken to provide security are encryption, authentication, authorization, access
control, firewall, IDS/IPS, Security incident, and event management (SIEM). This work describes
a typical approach in IDS and IPS by making it distributed to monitor the network activity of
the different networks. The primary approach is to protect the distributed network against attacks
on the DNP3 protocol. Several attack signatures were formulated and to prevent IDS rule were
designed. The design of the rule generation algorithm is explained based on different SCADA traffic
patterns. In this traffic pattern, various IDS rules are designed, and the flow chart is shown. The
implementation was deployed using several network architectures like standalone, distributed, and
In-line. The cyber attack classification is prepared within the scope of the lab, and the testing
is performed for designed IDS rules. Then, the evaluation of the IDS rules is completed to check
the best detection time. Experimental results are collected to show the best rule order sequence,
where the processing time is less for the rules placed on the top of the repository. The standard
defense strategy, as shown in the Figure 6.1 should be employed to make the network robust against
malicious threats and incidents.
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Figure 6.1 Defense Strategy
6.2 Future work
The possible extension of this work would be introducing data analytics. Data science is be-
coming a significant component in all cyber security research that will help in coming up with
new techniques to develop advanced detection. Use of advanced machine learning algorithm using
the network traffic data provides vast scope for future research. The network traffic has many
features that can be extracted and used for both supervised and unsupervised learning techniques.
Other techniques like Function code hashing in DNP3 communication can bring up the integrity
of the critical commands. Similarly, the concept of moving target defense on the link-layer station
address prevents attacks like Denial-of-service. The scope of this work can be extended by dynam-
ically changing the IDS rules depending on different types of cases. Cyber security, a modern and
futuristic research area, has a wide scope for different techniques. In the future, there is a plan
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